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Abstract
In Cauley v. City of Jacksonville’ the Supreme Court of Florida
recently faced a constitutional challenge to monetary limitations placed
on tort recovery against a municipality.
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In Cauley v. City of Jacksonville' the Supreme Court of Florida
recently faced a constitutional challenge to monetary limitations placed
on tort recovery against a municipality. In its July, 1981, decision the
court held Florida Statute Section 768.28(5), which imposed those
limitations, constitutionally valid.
In order to appreciate the impact of the Cauley decision, it must
be reviewed in historical perspective. This comment sets forth that per-
spective by considering the origin of "sovereign immunity" and furnish-
ing an overview of the case-made tests used to determine when immu-
nity attached to insulate municipalities from liability. Lastly, the
statute's provisions and Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County3 will be examined, providing a context in which Cauley can be
evaluated.
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity was based on the premise that the king could
do no wrong.4 Since the king was the supreme power, there could be
neither jurisdiction over him nor redress against him. Rather than ac-
knowledging a wrong without a remedy, the king was viewed as infalli-
ble and the doctrine of immunity was created.5 This legal fiction was
1. 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).
2. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977) (this provision of the statute remains un-
changed however the limits of recovery have been altered by ch. 81-317, 1981 Fla.
Laws 1488).
3. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
4. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 (reprinted
1966).
5. Id.
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later applied in the American states' based on "the idea that whatever
the state does must be lawful. . . . " Thus, absent its consent, a state
could not be sued in tort.8
Municipalities, as subdivisions of the state, have also been afforded
tort immunity for certain functions.9 Identifying those functions was
often a difficult task. Over time different tests have been employed to
help make the determination. However, courts have experienced consid-
erable difficulty and confusion when applying these tests.10
Case Development of Municipal Immunity
When the first test for municipal immunity was created, the major
issue was the distinction between governmental and proprietary func-
tions of a municipality. If the function was purely "governmental," im-
munity attached; a function that was "proprietary," "municipal" or
"corporate" was not protected.11 The question then became, how to
identify into which category a function fell.
In 1931, in Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa12 the city was
held liable for negligent operation of its incinerator. The Supreme
Court of Florida discussed the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions. The court adopted the view that "[g]overnmental
functions are those conferred on or imposed upon the municipality as
the local agency of limited and prescribed jurisdiction, to be employed
in administering the affairs of the state, and promoting the public wel-
fare generally."1 " The court used the term "municipal functions" in-
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 975 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 977.
10. Budetti & Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of Municipal
Tort Liability, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 927 (1978); Seligman & Beals, The Sovereignty of
Florida Municipalities: In-Again, Out-Again, When-Again, 50 FLA. B.J. 338 (1976).
11. See Wood v. City of Palatka, 63 So. 2d 636 (1953); City of Tampa v. Eas-
ton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 102 Fla.
501, 135 So. 457 (1931); Bryan v. City of West Palm Beach, 75 Fla. 19, 77 So. 627
(1918).
12. 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931).
13. Id. at 505, 135 So. at 459.
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/7
6:1982 Dollar Limits on Tort Recoveries 337
stead of "proprietary functions" or "corporate functions;" these terms
were interchangeable. 14 It defined municipal functions as those "which
specifically and particularly promote the comfort, convenience, safety
and happiness of the citizens of the municipality. . . .Under this class
of functions are included, in most jurisdictions, the proper care of
streets and alleys . . . and [other] improvements generally. 1 5
It appears the Florida Supreme Court has held consistently that
street maintenance was a city duty, and has viewed it as a proprietary
function.1 6 Therefore, the city traditionally lacked tort immunity in this
area. However, the line between governmental and municipal functions
was not always so easily drawn. In City of Tampa v. Easton,17 the
court recognized that "[w]hat are governmental functions and what are
corporate authority on duties of a municipality are not comprehensively
defined in the law but are to be determined in each case upon a judicial
interpretation and application of appropriate provisions or principles of
law to the facts legally shown or omitted [sic] ... ."8 The results
which have followed were often inconsistent andoconfusing.1
In 1957, after lower courts had wrestled with the "governmental-
14. See, e.g., cases cited in note 11 supra.
15. 102 Fla. at 506, 135 So. at 459 (emphasis added).
16. City of Miami Beach v. Quinn, 149 Fla. 326, 5 So. 2d 593 (1942); City of
Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of
Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931); Bryan v. City of West Palm Beach, 75 Fla.
19, 77 So. 627 (1918); Keggin v. County of Hillsborough, 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372
(1916).
17. 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
18. Id. at 192, 198 So. at 755.
19. See generally authorities cited in note 10 supra and Avery v. City of West
Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So. 2d 881 (1943). The city usually was held liable for
failure to properly maintain the streets or give warning of a dangerous condition in the
road. In City of Tampa v. Easton, the city was liable for injuries resulting from a
collision between an automobile and a city owned truck. The court found the city re-
sponsible for keeping the streets safe for traffic as well as keeping the surface of the
street in a safe condition. Since the city gave the truck driver consent to operate his
vehicle, the city was liable for the negligent injuries caused by the driver; however, in
Avery v. City of West Palm Beach, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a trial
court's holding that maintenance of traffic signals was a governmental function and,
therefore, immunity attached to the city. The court was unwilling to expand municipal
liability for failure to keep the streets safe to include failure to maintain traffic signals.
See also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132-33 (Fla. 1957).
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proprietary" distinction, the Florida Supreme Court cast aside that the-
ory and held municipalities could be liable for their employee's torts
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.20 Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach21 represents the court's attempt to clarify the confusion
resulting from the earlier decisions. In Hargrove a municipal corpora-
tion was sued on the basis of a wrongful death claim. The plaintiff
alleged the city was negligent because her husband, left unattended in
a locked jail cell, died of smoke inhalation. The court ultimately found
the city liable and recognized that up to this point the status of immu-
nity was confusing to Florida courts because of "an effort to prune and
pare the rule of immunity rather than to uproot it bodily and lay it
aside . . This pruning approach ha[d] produced numerous strange
and incongruous results."' 22 Reasoning that the "modern city [is] in
substantial measure a large business institution . . . [t]o continue to
endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity appears to us to
predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Cen-
tury anachronism. "23 ,
The court in Hargrove expanded the municipality's liability by
holding it liable for the torts of its policemen under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. "[W]hen an individual suffers a direct, personal
injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee
while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual
is entitled to redress for the wrong done."'24 The court expressly receded
from its prior decisions immunizing municipalities from liability for
torts committed by police officers acting within the scope of their em-
ployment.23 However, immunity was expressly preserved for the munic-
ipality when acting in a legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial capacity.26
Hargrove was restricted by Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,27 the
next Florida Supreme Court decision to greatly impact on the munici-
20. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 132, 133.
23. Id. at 133.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/7
Dollar Limits on Tort Recoveries 339 1
pal immunity issue. In Modlin, plaintiff's decedent was crushed to
death when portions of a store mezzanine fell on her. Plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action, alleging a city building code inspector negli-
gently inspected the building during its construction. The court viewed
the inspection as enforcement of the building code and, therefore,
found it an "executive" function.
Since Hargrove had specifically reserved immunity only for judi-
cial, legislative, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, the one
remaining area of potential liability was for executive functions. 28 Ad-
hering to the dictates of Hargrove, the Modlin court reasoned "that if
the respondent city [was] to escape liability, it [would] have [had] to
[do so] other than by the path of municipal immunity." 29
The Modlin court was creative in acknowledging an alternative
route for evading liability. Hargrove had held only that a city was lia-
ble for the torts of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, but did not furnish a dispositive guide to determining conditions
under which possible tort liability became absolute. While recognizing
that actionable negligence must present some breach of a duty owed,
the Modlin court also found "a doctrine of respectable lineage and
compelling logic that holds that this duty must be something more than
the duty that a public officer owes to the public generally."30 Armed
with that principle, the court proceeded to restrict municipal liability
for city employee negligence exclusively to those instances where a spe-
cial duty was owed to the particular plaintiff. Since the building in-
spector's duty to Mrs. Modlin was no greater than that owed the gen-
eral public, the court held the city was not liable.
In the wake of Modlin, it became apparent that municipal immu-
28. Id. The court proceeded to define the distinction between legislative, execu-
tive and judicial functions. It stated that, "legislative action prescribes a general rule
for future operation, whereas judicial and executive action is typically concerned with
applying the general rule to specific situations or persons." Id. A further distinction
was made between executive and judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The court stated,
"that a power authorized to be exercised on the personal judgment of the acting au-
thority is purely executive, but that where notice and hearing are required and action is
based upon the showing made at the hearing the action is judicial or quasi-judicial."
Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
16:1982
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nity was problematic to those trying to isolate and identify it. 1 Eight
years after Modlin, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal at-
tempted to clarify the issue of municipal immunity in Gordon v. City of
West Palm Beach."2 The court in Gordon summarized the status of
municipal tort liability:
1) as to those municipal activities which fall in the category of pro-
prietary functions a municipality has the same tort liability as a
private corporation;
2) as to those activities which fall in the category of governmental
functions ". . . a municipality is liable in tort, under the doctrine
of respondent [sic] superior, only when such tort is committed
against one with whom the agent or employee is in privity, or with
whom he is dealing or is otherwise in contact in a direct transac-
tion or confrontation." City of Tampa v. Davis ....
3) as to those activities which fall in the category of judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative, and quasi-legislative functions, a muncipality
remains immune. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, supra; Mod-
lin v. City of Miami Beach, supra.33
Gordon involved a wrongful death action brought by a father
whose son was killed when his motorcycle hit an automobile at an in-
tersection. The complaint alleged negligence by the city in the "design,
construction and maintenance of the streets and for .. . failure to
warn of a known hazardous condition.' Since the plaintiff claimed
negligent maintenance of the streets, which historically had exposed a
city to liability, 5 this claim was actionable. However, the allegation of
city negligence for failure to install and maintain traffic controls failed
to present a viable cause of action because the court viewed these as
31. Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 349 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1977). The court in Gordon stated:
"We are frank to admit that the current status of municipal tort liability is not at all
clear since the advent of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach; Modlin v. City of Miami
Beach, and subsequent cases attempting to interpret the breadth and scope of those two
cases." Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 80 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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immunized governmental functions.36
Statutory Waiver of Immunity and Judicial Determination of
its Scope
The same year the Gordon case was decided, Florida Statute Sec-
tion 768.28, waiving tort immunity for the state and all its subdivisions,
became effective.37 The statute affects the state and its agencies or sub-
divisions, expressly including municipalities.3 8 Although the statute is a
waiver of immunity, the legislature placed limitations on monetary
recovery.
(5) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for
tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
36. Id. See also discussion in note 19 supra.
37. Ch. 73-313, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711 which provided § 768.28 would be
effective January 1, 1975; Ch. 74-235, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 664 amended the effective
date of § 768.28 as applied only to the executive departments to be July 1, 1974.
Gordon v. City of Miami Beach was decided October 10, 1975. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1)
(Supp. 1980) waives sovereign immunity for tort liability for the state, its agencies or
subdivisions;
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for
itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immu-
nity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Ac-
tions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to re-
cover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies
or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivi-
sion, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations
specified in this act.
Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (Supp. 1980).
(2) As used in this act, "State agencies or subdivisions" include the execu-
tive departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch, and the independent
establishments of the state; counties and municipalities; and corporations
primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or
municipalities.
341 1Dollar Limits on Tort Recoveries16:1982
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individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include
punitive damages or interest for the period prior to judgment.
Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to
pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the
sum of $50,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof,
which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the
state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident
or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $100,000. However, a judgment
or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these
amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to
$50,000 or $100,000, as the case may be, and that portion of the
judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Leg-
islature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of
the Legislature. The limitations of liability set forth in this sub-
section shall apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions
whether or not the state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed
sovereign immunity prior to July 1, 1974.39
Because municipalities had not shared the same immunities as the
state and its other subdivisions prior to the enactment of section
768.28, the statute's applicability to municipalities was questioned. The
Attorney General responded40 by saying that "the state's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity contained in § 768.28 does not operate to limit in any
substantive way the tort liability of municipalities under the doctrine of
respondeat superior."" In 1977,11 responding to the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion, the legislature added the last sentence of section
768.28(5) which is italicized above.43 Thus the legislature mandated
that municipalities were included not only in the waiver of immunity,44
39. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). The amount recov-
erable has been increased to $100,000 for a single claimant and $200,000 per occur-
rence. Ch. 81-317, 1981 Fla. Laws 1488.
40. Fla. Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 70-71 (1976).
41. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
42. Ch. 77-86, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 162.
43. In the preamble of chapter 77-86 of the Florida Laws, the legislature stated
that "the Attorney General, in his opinion number 076-41, dated February 23, 1976,
failed to recognize the basis for the limitation of liability set forth in subsection (5) of
section 768.28, Fla. Statutes. . . " Ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws at 161. Recognizing the
need for clarification, the legislature amended § 768.28(5).
44. Ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws 161-62.
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but also in the limitation of liability,4 5 even though they had not en-
joyed the same immunities as the state and other subdivisions prior to
July 1, 1974.
Despite apparently broad statutory waiver of immunity in 1975 via
Section 768.28, Florida's courts were unsure of its scope. Faced with
this uncertainty, the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County,46 reconciled the statute with common
law immunity. In this landmark decision the court articulated Florida's
present test which affords immunity for acts involving planning or pol-
icy decisions since these were found to be beyond statutory waiver. In
contrast, under Commercial Carrier, operational or implementing ac-
tivities were found to be within the statute and not immune from tort
liability. Although the case involved actions brought against a county,
rather than a municipality, Commercial Carrier clarified the status of
immunity as it pertained to the state and all its subdivisions.
The case, accepted on certiorari, was a consolidation of two sepa-
rate cases out of Florida's Third District Court of Appeal: Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,47 and Cheney v. Dade County.4
In Commercial Carrier the original plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action based on a fatal collision at an unmarked intersection in Indian
River County in which the Florida Department of Transportation
(DOT) and Indian River County were named third party defendants.
The complaint alleged the county was negligent for failing to maintain
a stop sign and that DOT was negligent for failing to paint the word
"STOP" at the intersection. At first blush it would appear that under
the broad language of section 768.28 tort immunity had been waived.
However, the trial court found failure to maintain a traffic signal not
45. Id.
46. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). See also Drake & Oldham, The King is Dead,
Long Live the Emperor: Commercial Carrier Decision and the Status of Governmental
Immunity in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 504 (1979); Comment, Torts - The Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity is Alive and Well - Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), 8 FLA. ST. L. REv. 377 (1980).
47. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
48. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
6:1982 Dollar Limits on Tort Recoveries
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actionable and dismissed the third party complaint.49 The dismissal was
upheld by the appellate court.
In Cheney the petitioner alleged Dade County negligently main-
tained a traffic signal which directly caused the accident and injury to
the plaintiff in the original action. The city moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on grounds of sovereign immunity and the trial court granted the
motion. The appellate court upheld the dismissal, finding that Florida's
statutory waiver of immunity would not create liability in this case
under Modlin and that the duty owed Cheney was that owed to the
public in general. 50
In the consolidated action the Florida Supreme Court invalidated
the special duty-general duty test of Modlin, 1 and then focused its at-
tention on legislative intent for the scope of waiver under section
768.28. The court acknowledged the Federal Tort Claims Act 52 as the
basis for section 768.28 but noted Florida's statute, unlike the federal
act, did not expressly exempt discretionary acts from liability. How-
ever, the court found, despite the absence of express statutory lan-
guage, other jurisdictions had recognized a discretionary exception. Af-
ter looking at other jurisdictions for guidance, the court recognized a
discretionary exception in Florida. The more difficult second step was
to determine how "discretionary functions" could be identified.
Since the term appeared elusive of any universal definition, other
jurisdictions developed tests to help identify a discretionary function.
The Washington Supreme Court, in Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State,53 developed a test consisting of four questions which
Commercial Carrier adopted as its guide.
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily in-
volve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the
questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to
one which would not change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision re-
49. 371 So. 2d at 1013; 342 So. 2d at 1049.
50. 371 So. 2d at 1014; 353 So. 2d at 626.
51. 371 So. 2d at 1016.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1975).
53. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
10
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quire the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and exper-
tise on the part of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the
governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision? 5 '.
The Florida Supreme Court commended case-by-case utilization
of this test in Florida 5 and adopted "the analysis of Johnson v. State
...which distinguishes between the 'planning' and 'operational' levels
of decision-making by governmental agencies.1 56 The discretionary
54. 371 So. 2d at 1019 citing 67 Wash. 2d at -, 407 P.2d at 445. Instructing the
lower courts on application of this guide, the Washington Supreme Court said if all
questions could be answered affirmatively, then the questioned act could reasonably be
classified as discretionary. If one or more could be answered negatively, further inquiry
would be necessary to determine whether the act was in fact discretionary.
55. Many courts have not used the test adopted in Commercial Carrier and a
possible reason for this may have been articulated in Wallace v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979). That court found "the new test
substituted in Commercial Carrier. . .to be a complex four point test, which might
with some judicial straining, be construed either to exempt each and every governmen-
tal action, or alternatively, exclude none of them." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
56. 371 So. 2d at 1022. The court was referring to Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d
782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). In Johnson, plaintiff's complaint alleged
that plaintiff was requested by the state's employee Mr. Baer to provide a foster home
for a particular youth. Further, defendant's employee negligently allowed a youth with
homicidal tendencies and a history of violence and cruelty to be placed in plaintiff's
home without notice of these propensities. Plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries as a re-
sult of this negligence. The state moved for summary judgment on the ground of im-
munity. The trial judge granted the motion and plaintiff appealed. Id.
Looking to a statute which expressly immunizes public employees for discretionary
acts, the Supreme Court of California was faced with a determination of whether im-
munity would attach under the facts of this case. Recognizing that some discretion
would be involved in any official act, the court acknowledged that further analysis
would be necessary. The court articulated a distinction between "planning" and "oper-
ational" functions. Under this distinction, those planning functions which involved poli-
cymaking would be immunized while the implementation of that policy would not be
immunized. Id.
In applying that distinction to this case, the court found that the decision to parole
a youth would be a policy consideration deserving immunity. However, once the deci-
sion to parole is made, any action to place the parolee with a family is merely a minis-
terial act and not deserving of immunity. Id.
The court cited numerous cases which immunized policy decisions but not the acts
11
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function exception would apply only to planning level functions but not
to operational level functions: "planning level functions are generally
interpreted to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while opera-
tional level functions are those that implement policy."17 Thus, plan-
ning functions are generally equated with purely governmental func-
tions, whereas operational functions are generally equated with
proprietary or ministerial functions.
Having accepted these distinctions, the court found that mainte-
nance of traffic signals and painting the word "STOP" were opera-
tional functions and consequently were not within the discretionary
function exemption. Therefore, the county was not immunized from lia-
bility, and both Cheney and Commercial Carrier were remanded to the
district court with instructions for remand to the respective trial courts
for further proceedings.
Although Commercial Carrier provided guidelines for courts to
identify discretionary functions, the guidelines appear susceptible to in-
congruous results. Illustrative of this incongruity is Ferla v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County.5" Concerning an accident on Rickenbacker Cause-
way, plaintiffs alleged the county was negligent in four areas: (1) the
design of the median strip, (2) the determination of the speed limit, (3)
the width of the lanes and (4) the failure to erect a barrier. Using the
"planning" level/"operational" level distinction, the court found item
(1) was an "operational" level decision; items (2) and (3) involved
"planning" level decisions and item (4) would have to be factually de-
veloped before a determination could be made. In reaching this deci-
sion, the court stated,
The distinction we feel compelled to draw between the median de-
sign and the lane width situations, the essential basis of which is
difficult indeed to articulate, well illustrates the self-acknowledged
"deficiencies" and "lack of certainty and predictability," Commer-
cial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, . . . involved in the
analysis contained in Johnson v. State. . ., which our court specif-
which carried out the decision and stated that most of the cases involved a "failure to
warn of foreseeable, latent dangers flowing from the basic immune decision." Id. at _,
447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (footnote omitted).
57. 371 So. 2d at 1021 (footnote omitted).
58. 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Nova Law Journal
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ically adopted in the Commercial Carrier case.
59
Constitutionality of Recovery Limits as Applied to
Municipalities
While Commercial Carrier ostensibly clarified the status of immu-
nity and recognized a discretionary function exception, questions re-
mained regarding the constitutionality of statutory limitations placed
on recoveries against municipalities. Two years after Commercial Car-
rier, Cauley v. City of Jacksonville,6" held constitutional that portion
of section 768.28(5) providing monetary limitations on tort recoveries.
Cauley concerned an area in which municipalities had never been
afforded immunity, the negligent maintenance of streets.61 The facts of
the case were undisputed. Mrs. Cauley alleged the existence of a dan-
gerous condition in the road for a period of time and the city's negli-
gence in not repairing the condition or giving adequate warning of it.
Mrs. Cauley further alleged that she was injured as a result of the
city's failure to repair or warn of the condition. The jury awarded her
$400,000 in damages, and her husband $200,000 for loss of consor-
tium. Because Mrs. Cauley was found seventy-five percent responsible
for her injury, the judgment was accordingly reduced to a total of
$150,000. The city motioned for reduction of the judgment to $100,000
as limited by section 768.28(5).2 The trial court granted the motion
and expressly held section 768.28(5) constitutional.
In Cauley, appellants challenged the constitutionality of section
768.28(5) which limited their recovery on a judgment against the City
of Jacksonville. Prior to enactment of the state's waiver of immunity,
together with its limitations on recovery, the Cauleys would have been
entitled to an unlimited recovery. Florida's Supreme Court stated the
issue in Cauley "concern[ed] the validity of that portion of Sec.
59. Id. at 68 n.1 (citations omitted).
60. 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).
61. Since the maintenance of streets has been consistently held to be a duty of
the city, the city traditionally did not have immunity for this proprietary function. See
note 16 supra.
62. The limitations have since been increased to $100,000 for a single claimant
and $200,000 per occurrence. See note 39 supra.
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768.28(5) which limits compensatory damages against municipalities
for negligent performance of operational-level or proprietary func-
tions." ' Admittedly the court narrowed the issue to deal exclusively
with municipalities because it stated (without demonstrating) that
Commercial Carrier found section 768.28(5) constitutional, as it re-
lated to the limitation on recoveries against the state and its counties."
The majority in Cauley ultimately held the cap on recovery
against municipalities as constitutional. The appellants had alleged sev-
eral grounds of constitutional error: due process and equal protection
rights had been violated; denial of access to the courts and jury trial;
the statute violated the separation of powers; and circuit court depriva-
tion of power to issue necessary writs. The majority considered these
allegations of constitutional error and summarily stated, "[w]e reject
all these contentions.1
6 5
Striking appellants' constitutional arguments, the Cauley majority
relied on Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.66 to justify legislative imposition of recovery limits. But the major-
ity failed to explain why it relied on Duke Power Co., a factually dis-
tinguishable North Carolina case holding constitutional a federal stat-
ute limiting recovery on nuclear reactor accidents. In addition, the
63. 403 So. 2d at 381. The court had jurisdiction to hear the issue under article
V, § 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution which provides the supreme court "[s]hall
hear appeals . . . from orders of trial courts . . . initially and directly passing on the
validity of a state statute . . . ." Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1972).
64. Chief Justice Sundberg, who wrote the majority opinion in Commercial Car-
rier, states in the dissent in Cauley that Commercial Carrier decided only the scope of
the waiver under § 768.28. Therefore, it would appear to this writer that if Commer-
cial Carrier held § 768.28(5) to be constitutional, it was by implication only. The court
merely reversed the dismissals of Commercial Carrier's and Cheney's third party com-
plaints. The respective trial courts had found immunity attached when a county failed
to maintain traffic controls, but the supreme court found to the contrary. It determined
the granting of immunity for decisions regarding traffic control maintenance in the past
was no longer valid under the dictates of § 768.28, since immunity was found to exist
only for discretionary functions at the planning level and not for operational or mainte-
nance functions. By so doing, the court determined only the scope of the waiver under §
768.28 and not the constitutionality of any monetary limitations on recovery as pro-
vided in § 768.28(5).
65. Id. at 384.
66. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The dissent questioned the application of this case. See
notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text infra.
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majority stated that it previously found legislation restricting recovery
in the workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance ar-
eas constitutional. 67 The arguments rejected in these earlier cases were
"[s]ubstantially the same"68 as the attacks rejected in Cauley.
The majority opinion considered and rejected appellants' argument
that Kluger v. White69 disposed of the case sub judice. In Kluger, Flor-
ida Statute Section 627.73870 was held unconstitutional when chal-
lenged on the ground that it did not comply with the Florida Constitu-
tion, article I, section 21. Florida's Constitution provides "[t]he Courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall
be administered without sale, denial or delay. '7 1 The issue in Kluger
was whether this constitutional guarantee "bar[red] the statutory abo-
lition of an existing remedy without providing an alternative protection
to the injured party. 71 2 The Kluger court held
that where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particu-
lar injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adop-
tion of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of
Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law
of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is
without power to abolish such a right without providing a reason-
able alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to
redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpower-
ing public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alter-
native method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.73
67. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977) (workmen's
compensation); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (no-fault auto-
mobile insurance). The dissent distinguishes both cases. See notes 84-86 and accompa-
nying text infra.
68. 403 So. 2d at 384.
69. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
70. The statute provided that an action for recovery of property damage result-
ing from an automobile collision could only be maintained if two conditions occurred:
first, if the owner had chosen not to buy insurance protection against property damage
and second, if the damage exceeded five hundred and fifty dollars. The imposed mini-
mum dollar amount of the statute precluded the appellant from maintaining an action
because the value of her car was only two hundred and fifty dollars.
71. Fla. Const. art. I, § 21.
72. 281 So. 2d at 3.
73. Id. at 4.
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The Cauley majority, however, rejected Kluger as inapposite. 4
The court's rejection was based on the belief that no statutory right to
recovery against a municipality for its negligence existed prior to Flor-
ida's adoption of the constitutional declaration of rights. In addition the
court found no common law right pursuant to Florida Statute Section
2.01. 7
The majority viewed section 768.28 as a way of bringing "fairness,
equality and consistency to an area of the law which ...has been
beset with contradiction, inconsistency and confusion. '70 The court rec-
ognized that treating municipalities in parity with state and counties
provided a benefit not outweighed by possible harm to individual plain-
tiffs who would no longer be entitled to unlimited recoveries. Munici-
palities, which had become more like other subdivisions of the state,
and are governmental entities, should not be treated as "partial out-
casts."77 Further, treating municipalities equally eliminates the need to
determine which rules apply when actions against city and county are
consolidated as in Cauley. However, even-handed application of section
768.28(5) to all the state's subdivisions actually results in a modified
immunity for municipalities. In areas where a municipality did not re-
ceive immunity prior to enactment of section 768.28, they will now be
protected by monetary limitations on recovery. It is this capping of a
previously unlimited recovery, without providing what is viewed as a
reasonable alternative, which formed the basis of Cauley's dissent.
Chief Justice Sundberg, writing for the dissent, stated that "the
majority has misconstrued case law and blurred traditional distinctions
between immunity for state, county and municipal governments. 78 He
found the first such misapplication in the majority's reliance on Com-
mercial Carrier9 which Sundberg, its author, viewed as having decided
only the scope of section 768.28 waiver for the state and counties.80
74. 403 So. 2d at 385.
75. Id. However, the dissent strenuously opposed this interpretation of Kluger.
For a discussion of the basis for this opposition, see note 89 and accompanying text
infra.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 386.
78. Id. at 387.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The Chief Justice asserted Commercial Carrier recognized municipal
rules for determining immunity were not to be applied to the state and
counties and that Commercial Carrier did not expressly discard the
rules governing municipal liability.81 The dissent viewed the imposition
of a cap on recovery as an unjustified protection for municipalities in
an area where protection had previously not been enjoyed, specifically,
in disputes arising from allegations of negligent performance of propri-
etary or operational functions.
Sundberg buttressed his dissent by criticizing as well majority reli-
ance on Duke Power Co., a case dealing with a federal act providing
no-fault recovery for injuries resulting from a nuclear accident.8 2 A
compelling interest in Duke necessitated change in traditional tort re-
coveries. Moreover, Duke was a federal decision and there is no
analagous counterpart in the Florida constitutional provision for access
to the courts.8 3 Lastly, Chief Justice Sundberg found the majority mis-
placed reliance on Halligan4 and Lasky,85 which were distinguishable
from Cauley since these cases dealt with providing a remedy without
requiring proof of fault.8 "
Chief Justice Sundberg believed Kluger applicable87 and control-
ling8 of Cauley. He asserted that common law action against a munic-
ipality existed prior to adoption of Florida's Constitution 9 and that
Florida embraced this cause of action via Florida Statute Section
81. Id.
82. In support of the dissent's disagreement with the reliance placed on this case,
let it be added that besides placing a limit on recovery at $560 million in the event of a
nuclear accident, a fund was set up to make sure that amount was readily available.
The fund protects prospective plaintiffs since any one nuclear reactor would not be able
to raise $560 million on their own. Thus the statute presently provides potential plain-
tiffs with ready access to a guaranteed $560 million; Congress recognized that the
amount can be increased should the need arise.
83. 403 So. 2d at 388-89.
84. 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977).
85. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
86. 403 So. 2d at 388.
87. Id. at 387.
88. Id.
89. Chief Justice Sundberg found the common law cause of action espoused in a
legal maxim which propounds that the law gives a remedy with full and just compensa-
tion for the negligent injuries caused by another. Id. at 388.
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2.01.190 Therefore, applying the strictures of Kluger, one of two condi-
tions must be present for valid abolition of a cause of action: either the
legislature must 1) provide a reasonable alternative for recompense or
2) show an overpowering public necessity and no other method of meet-
ing the public need. The dissent found neither condition present and
viewed "[tihe effect of Section 768.28(5) [as] . . . forc[ing] a plaintiff
to give up a common law right and receive nothing in return.""1 Al-
though the plaintiff is entitled to some monetary recovery under the
statute, Chief Justice Sundberg evidently did not view this as a reason-
able alternative within the purview of Kluger. Therefore, applying the
holding of Kluger to the facts of Cauley, the dissent advised that the
portion of section 768.28(5) limiting recoveries be held "unconstitu-
tional as applied to municipalities." 92
Conclusion
Municipalities may breathe easier knowing their financial expo-
sure is limited. However, the court has explained little of the reasoning
it used in determining that the ceiling on municipal tort recoveries was
constitutional. The majority silenced the arguments presented under
the access to courts mandate of article I, section 21 of the Florida Con-
stitution by declaring Kluger inapplicable. Consequently, the majority
deftly avoided having to determine whether section 768.28(5) provided
the alternative right to recompense necessary for the valid abolition of
an existing remedy.
By its action, the Florida Supreme Court has made it clear that a
plaintiff suing a municipality must look to the legislature for any
amount awarded exceeding the statutory limitations. 93 It may be a
hollow victory, for the plaintiff who is awarded a large verdict must
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Ch. 73-317, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711, as originally enacted, provided that
insurance coverage above the statutory limitations of § 768.28(5) served to expand
recovery to the extent of coverage. Id. at 712. See § 768.28(10). However, that provi-
sion was repealed by ch. 77-86, 1977 Fla. Laws 161. Thus at present, a plaintiff may
only recover more than the limitations of § 768.28(5) through further act of the
legislature.
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then expend more time and energy trying to convince the legislature it
is deserved. 4 The Florida Supreme Court may one day be forced to
address a separation of powers issue because the legislature has, in es-
sence, set itself up as the last judge and jury.
Mary Ava Bobko
94. While claims bills have been very successful, there are a series of procedures
which must be followed before the plaintiff may be able to recover the full amount of
their judgment. First, the claims bill must be prepared and submitted. Next, a hearing
is conducted by a Special Master, who in turn prepares a final report and recommenda-
tion for the Committee on Judiciary. If the claim is reported favorably by the commit-
tee, it must then pass in the House, the Senate, and finally reach the Governor. See M.
ROBINSON, INTRODUCTION OF CLAIMS BILLS, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND INFORMA-
TION (January 1982) (Prepared for Representative Hamilton Upchurch, Chairman,
Committee on Judiciary).
3531
16:1982
19
Bobko: Constitutionality of Florida's Statute Limiting Tort Recovery Aga
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
